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ABSTRACT 
 
 The field of civil conflict research focuses on how the structural features of states 
influence the odds of civil war occurring. This thesis discusses the impact that 
independence leaders and their reputations have on the likelihood of civil war incidence. 
Using data for every post-independence leader in Africa until 2004, I find that 
independence leaders are significantly less likely to experience civil war than a non 
independence leader in any given year, all else being equal. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 On March 29, 2008 Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) eclipsed incumbent president Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National 
Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) by nearly five percentage points in Zimbabwe’s first 
round of the presidential election. Tsvangirai’s first round victory created a situation in 
which it seemed imminent that a new leader would take office for the first time since 
Mugabe rose to power in 1980. Despite his openly stated belief that he had secured a 
simple majority in the first round, Tsvangirai agreed to a June 27, 2008 run-off election 
against Mugabe. International coverage of Zimbabwe over the next three months 
regularly contained stories of fraudulent exercises and abuse against MDC supporters.  
“Compelling evidence of violence, intimidation and outright terror; the 
studied harassment of the leadership of the MDC, including its 
presidential candidate, by the security organs of the Zimbabwean 
government; the arrest and detention of the secretary general of the MDC; 
the banning of MDC public meetings; and denial of access to the 
Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation - have all convinced us that free and 
fair elections are not possible in the political environment prevalent in 
Zimbabwe today.”1 
 
The violence against his supporters led Tsvangirai to withdraw from the runoff, despite 
his projected victory.2 Mugabe won a landslide victory in the uncontested runoff, which 
was denounced by the South African Development Community (SADC), the African 
Union (AU), and many western nations.  
 Over the next year and a half, Zimbabwe’s situation worsened considerably, 
especially in the realm of economics. Zimbabwe’s 2009 purchasing power parity per 
                                                 
1
 “SAfrica: ANC Says Dismayed by Zimbabwe Government’s Actions amid Crisis.” BBC Monitoring 
Africa - Political 24 June 2008. Lexis Nexis. Web. 
2
 “Zimbabwe; SADC Observer Mission Says Elections Were Undemocratic.” Africa  
 News 1 July 2008. Lexis Nexis. Web. 
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capita was ranked 228th in the world at $200; a value expected to decrease as the state 
was experiencing a -12.6 percent rate of economic growth, an unemployment rate of 95 
percent, and an inflation rate in excess of 14.9 billion percent.3 Politically, the fears of 
MDC supporters increased as Tsvangirai made a suspicious power sharing deal with the 
ZANU-PF, and shortly after was nearly killed in a head on automobile collision that 
fatally wounded his wife.4  
 It is curious that Zimbabwe has not erupted into a state of civil war when one 
considers the combination of political oppression, dire economic circumstances, ethnic 
divisions, and a handful of other factors that are commonly seen as indicators of conflict 
that exists in the state.5 In fact, Zimbabwe possesses eight or nine of the most common 
predictors of civil war, and yet has not seen substantial violence against the government. 
 There are other cases in which administrations avoided rebellions despite being 
responsible for many conditions that commonly lead to civil war. Examples include the 
first three decades of Mobutu’s reign in Zaire and Houphouët-Boigny’s 33 year reign in 
Côte d’Ivoire. Houphouët-Boigny was responsible for the existence of some civil war 
determinants in Côte d’Ivoire, when he failed to diversify the Ivorian economy causing 
its economy to collapse, generating serious political instability. In addition, “no one ever 
pretended the Ivory Coast under Houphouët-Boigny was a paradise of enlightened 
                                                 
3
 CIA - The World Factbook.” Welcome to the CIA Web Site — Central Intelligence Agency. Web. 04 Apr. 
2010. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html>. 
4
 “Mystery Crash Kills Tsvangirai’s Wife - Africa, World - The Independent.” The Independent | News | 
UK and Worldwide News | Newspaper. Web. 04 Apr. 2010. 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/mystery-crash-kills-tsvangirais-wife-1639249.html>. 
5
 The other factors implied here are a small military (only spending 3.8% of its already low GDP), a lack of 
secondary schooling (the average student only finishes 9 years of education), a dispersed population, a 
reliance on primary commodity exports (with platinum, cotton, tobacco, and gold being the top four). A 
weak argument could be made for Zimbabwe having a large population which is 11 million and the 23rd 
most in Africa. (CIA World Factbook and Mara.org) 
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democracy, he was in charge and everyone knew it.”6 Still, Côte d’Ivoire experienced 
zero civil wars during the 33 years he was in power, and when Houphouët-Boigny 
opened up the system to competitive elections in 1990, he “won handily.”7 After 33 years 
of peace under Houphouët-Boigny, Côte d’Ivoire erupted into a state of civil war less 
than a decade after his reign ended.  
In this thesis, I explain why some countries with precipitating structural 
preconditions experience rebellion and others do not. I argue and show that countries 
governed by a leader of their independence movement are less likely to experience civil 
war than countries governed by non independence leaders.    
There are multiple reasons why rebel groups are less likely to attack independence 
leaders than subsequent primary leaders.8 These reasons are generally related to the odds 
of victory being lower against independence leaders. Rebels have a smaller chance of 
victory against independence leaders because it is easier for independence leaders to 
recruit based on their position and reputation as a symbol of the state, and more difficult 
for rebel groups to recruit citizens to fight against an individual with such a reputation. 
The “reputation” of African leaders is admittedly difficult to demonstrate, as 
reliable survey data has ceased to exist on the continent today, and was not compiled at 
the time of independence. However, the revered reputation of independence leaders is an 
assumption of this thesis based on the most credible literature on the topic and various 
comments about such leaders made in credible newspapers around the world. Bratton and 
                                                 
6
 Payton, Jack R. “Houphouët-Boigny Steered Ivory Coast to Prosperity.” St. Petersburg Times [Florida] 9 
Dec. 1993, City Edition ed.  
7
 ibid 
8
 The term “primary leader” will be used in this paper to mean the individual who is recognized as the 
executive power holder. Depending on the case, this will mean the President, Prime Minister, or Military 
Leader.  
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Van de Walle (1997) refer to these leaders as “larger-than-life political leaders”9. Young 
and Turner cite that Mobutu was treated as a deity in Zaire.10 The following quote by 
Interior Minister Engulu supports the statement of Mobutu’s near deification: 
“In our religion, we have our own theologians. In all religions, and at all 
times, there are prophets. Why not today? God has sent a great prophet, 
our prestigious Guide Mobutu – this prophet is our liberator, our Messiah. 
Our Church is the MPR. Its chief is Mobutu, we respect him like one 
respects a Pope. Our gospel is Mobutuism. This is why the crucifixes must 
be replaced by the image of our Messiah. And party militants will want to 
place at its side his glorious mother, Mama Yemo, who gave birth to such 
a son.”11 
 
Jack R. Payton of the St. Petersburg Times (Florida) suggests that Houphouët-
Boigny’s reputation in Côte d’Ivoire paralleled Mobutu’s in Zaire, by stating that 
“Houphouët-Boigny was something of a god to his people”12 who was “known 
affectionately as ‘Papa.”13 Houphouët-Boigny’s reputation was so great, that when “in his 
presence, [crowds around Houphouët-Boigny] seemed transfixed, awe-struck, almost as 
if they had died and gone to heaven.”14 I believe that the perception of an elevated status 
of these leaders had a profound impact on the decisions made by their constituencies.  
I argue that independence leaders are less likely to experience civil war than their 
non independence counterparts. If this argument is correct, scholars and policy makers 
will have a greater capacity to know whether a civil war is likely in a country. For 
example, they will likely to predict relative peace in Zimbabwe’s near future because of 
                                                 
9
 Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle (1997). Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions 
in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge, 25. 
10
 Crawford Young and Thomas Turner (1985). “The Patrimonial State and Personal Rule,” in Young and 
Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 169. 
11
 ibid 
12
 Payton (1993). 
13
 Constantine, Gus. “Misrule Takes Toll on Ivory Coast; Self-interested Successors Spoil Work of ‘Papa’“ 
The Washington Times 12 Dec. 2002, Final Edition ed. 
14
 Payton (1993). It is worth noting that Payton is writing about the experience of meeting Houphouët-
Boigny in 1980, two decades into his rule. 
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Mugabe’s history as a leader of their independence. Perhaps more importantly, they will 
likely predict that Zimbabwe will finally succumb to the existing civil war determinants 
shortly after Mugabe relinquishes power. Such predictions will change the approach that 
external states, international organizations, and Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) take with Zimbabwe and other comparable states.  
 The findings of this thesis are not only salient to the anti-colonial independence 
leaders currently in power, but will remain useful in the future. Independence movements 
exist in all parts of the world today, and it will be useful to know how to act with respect 
to their new leaders if those movements are successful. It is important to note that many 
western powers, including the United States, heralded and supported the initial successes 
of Mobutu and Mugabe; and therefore enabled their later tyranny. Prominent examples of 
current independence movements include the southern region of Sudan, the Igbo in 
Nigeria, the Basques in Spain, and the Chechens in Russia. As recently as March 29, 
2010, Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi called for Nigeria to be divided into several 
individual states along ethnic lines.15 While it is unlikely that these independence 
movements will succeed, leaders of these movements are likely to play prominent roles in 
the civil society of their groups and states. Therefore, knowledge of how people act in 
response to big personas serving in leadership positions is pertinent to future research.  
However, a positive finding of the main hypothesis of this thesis will only show 
basic correlation, and can only help scholars and policy makers in making more accurate 
predictions. For them to be truly effective in addressing such countries, they must also 
know how the presence of an independence leader prevents civil war.  
                                                 
15
 “BBC News - Gaddafi Says Nigeria Should Split into Several States.” BBC NEWS | News Front Page. 
Web. 04 Apr. 2010. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8593355.stm>. 
  
6
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The literature that attempts to explain the causes of civil war typically falls into 
three broad categories; which are the “grievance”, “greed”, and “state’s capacity to 
repress” models. This review will briefly explain the arguments presented in each 
category.  
 Throughout the 1990s, the field was dominated by literature defending the 
grievance model, with Ted Gurr as the leading proponent. Gurr and those that agreed 
with him argued that:  
“Protest and rebellion by communal groups are jointly motivated by deep-
seated grievances about group status and by the situationally determined 
pursuit of political interest, as formulated by group leaders and political 
entrepreneurs.”16 
 
The grievances considered to be determinants of civil war that are cited most often are 
group disadvantages, political and economic differentials, loss of group autonomy, 
poverty, and discrimination17. In general, grievance scholars contend that civil wars arise 
as a result of one group feeling deprived relative to another group within their state. Gurr 
consistently uses the phrase “communal group,” which can be any group within a state 
that self identifies as a collective unit, but is most commonly a group characterized by 
religion, ethnicity, or language. In Gurr’s opinion, conflict is essential in the process of 
defining and strengthening these groups’ identities.18 
 The articles written in the 1990s make bold statements as to the dominance of the 
grievance explanation, claiming that “communal grievances have driven the most 
                                                 
16
 Gurr, Ted Robert (1993). “Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and 
Conflict Since 1945,” International Political Science Review 14(2), 161. 
17
 ibid 
18
 ibid, 162. 
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persistent civil wars of the last 40 years”19 and that 49 out of 58 ongoing conflicts in 1995 
were ethnopolitical.20 
 The grievance explanation is also dependent on the mobilization model to more 
adequately explain the process of civil war onset.21 Mobilization scholars improve upon 
the grievance model by explaining that while grievances may cause the desire for civil 
war, they alone do not enable groups to act on their anger. The inability of groups to act 
on their anger is often the result of a collective action problem; the failure of separate 
individuals or groups to act as a cohesive unit in order to accomplish shared goals.  
The collective action problem is often the result of individuals choosing to free 
ride. Free riders are individuals that do not act on behalf of the group, yet can still reap 
the benefits of the group’s success. In the example of civil war, it is often an entire region 
or ethnic group that gains freedom or political power in the event of victory, not only 
those who physically fought. Members of said region or ethnic group that gain such 
benefits without physically fighting are “free riders”. Free riding is a danger to rebel 
groups, for without sufficient forces a rebellion will inevitably fail. Groups wishing to 
legitimately challenge their state’s government must avoid this problem and have the 
capacity for joint action.22  
Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) convincingly dispute the notion that non-participation 
is significantly more costly than participation when it comes to war, because non-
                                                 
19
 ibid, 188. 
20
 Gurr, Ted Robert and Will H. Moore (1997). “A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk 
Assessments for the 1990s,” American Journal of Political Science 41(4), 1079. 
21
 Regan, Patrick M. and Daniel Norton (2005). “Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(3), 321. 
22
 ibid 
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combatants are often at risk of being killed.23 Even if free riding is not a large problem, 
collective action is still necessary in order to organize, coordinate, and administer 
communication within the grievance group. 
Under the mobilization model, political entrepreneurs specialize in overcoming 
the collective action problem. Group leaders and political entrepreneurs capitalize on the 
opportunity to gain power by using shared grievances as a rallying cry to collect and 
mobilize group members. Political entrepreneurs overcome free riding by issuing side 
payments to those who fight, thereby increasing the opportunity cost of not fighting. As 
rebel forces increase in quantity and war duration drags on, these side payments become 
exceedingly costly, providing rebel leaders with incentive (or necessity) to loot state 
resources and disperse them among their soldiers.24 Regan and Norton (2005) support the 
proposal that greed prevents soldiers from defecting away from rebellion.25  
 Since the turn of the 21st century, the greed model has gained salience in the field 
of civil conflict research. The greed argument lists a much more cynical set of civil war 
determinants. Greed model proponents, mainly Paul Collier, argue that grievance is a 
norm across the African continent, and that it is only the situations in which greed takes 
over that civil war will occur. Africa’s poor economic progress makes it vulnerable to 
civil war, as group leaders are forced to search for alternative modes of income for their 
group.26 Seizing state power to gain the rights of taxation or seizing control of the state’s 
primary commodity exports are lucrative and enticing options for desperately poor 
                                                 
23
 Kalyvas, Stathis N., and Matthew Adam Kocher. “How “Free” Is Free Riding in Civil Wars? Violence, 
Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem.” World Politics (2007): 177-216. Web, 185.  
24
 Lujala, Päivi, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmore (2005). “A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a 
Lootable Resource,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4), 540.  
25
 Regan and Norton (2005), 325. 
26
 Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2002). “On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 46(1), 14. 
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groups.  Rebel groups can also raise funds by collecting from sympathetic diasporas or 
subvention on the part of hostile governments.27 To the greed scholars, grievances are 
merely tools for opportunistic leaders seeking power and wealth. Proponents of the greed 
model repeatedly find empirical evidence that optimal scenarios for the greedy (a state’s 
reliance on primary commodity exports and military advantage for the rebels such as 
mountainous terrain) are significant determinants of civil war onset. These same scholars 
continuously find that ethnic diversity and lack of political rights are not significant 
indicators of civil war, as Gurr and his colleagues postulate.28 Conversely, Collier and 
Hoeffler (2002) find that fractionalized societies are less likely to experience civil war.29  
 The third model of thought contends that civil wars occur when a state’s capacity 
to repress rebellion is low, so that the likelihood of rising insurgencies is high. This group 
is contemporaneous to Collier and Hoeffler and is led by James Fearon and David Laitin. 
These scholars argue that many African states have seen situations of both greed and 
grievance, but did not experience civil war because either their government avoided 
facing rebellion by sufficiently repressing rebellion groups before violence began, or 
because an effective insurgency failed to establish itself. State capacity scholars and 
mobilization scholars agree that certain variables facilitate collective action for 
insurgencies; including a large population and poverty.30 However, state capacity 
proponents alone argue the importance of “the state’s capacity to repress” in predicting 
civil war. A state’s capacity to repress is contingent upon its political stability, the terrain 
                                                 
27
 Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2004). “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 
56(4), 568. 
28
 Collier and Hoeffler (2002), 17.  
29
 ibid 
30
 Fearon, James D. and David Laitin (2003). “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” American Political 
Science Review 97(1), 75. 
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of the country, and the income of the government.31 These scholars refute the 
significance of ethnic, religious, or linguistic divisions; respect for civil liberties; foreign 
support; trade openness; and a state’s reliance on primary commodities as civil war 
determinates.32 
 In the past few years, some civil war scholars have logically chosen to explain 
civil war through a combination of the three models. Regan and Norton (2005) contend 
that collective action for civil war begins as a result of shared grievances, but can only 
continue if greed exists to help prevent defection.33 Lujala et al. (2005) argue that there 
are three factors that are essential for the onset of civil war: motives, either positive or 
negative (greed or grievance); opportunity, collective action and money (mobilization); 
and a common identity (which is also considered as essential in the grievance 
literature).34 Hegre and Sambanis (2006) ran a plethora of robustness tests to show that 
various determinants from different fields are significant.35  
 While one or a combination of these three theories can explain many of the 
world’s civil conflicts, they fail to account for Zimbabwe’s unexpected peace.  A possible 
reason for these theories’ shortcomings is that they focus heavily on the structural 
features of states, and little on the human aspect of leadership. The greed and grievance 
models focus heavily on the economic and political aspects of the state, for example 
variables such as what commodities are available for exploit, economic measures and 
democratic values. The state’s capacity to repress model focuses on the resources 
                                                 
31
 ibid 
32
 ibid 
33
 Regan and Norton (2005), 319. 
34
 Lujala et al (2005), 539. 
35
 Hegre, Håvard and Nicholas Sambanis (2006). “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War 
Onset,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(1) 
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available to the state, such as military strength or the prowess of the police force. These 
variables would arguably be the same (or similar) regardless of which individual is in 
power. I believe that differences between individual leaders make a substantial difference 
in the mindset of the public, and contend that the reputation of the leadership has a drastic 
effect on the decision-making of its constituents. In this thesis, I intend to show that 
countries whose primary leader is a former independence leader of their nation are less 
likely to experience civil war than countries whose primary leader is not an independence 
leader. 
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CHAPTER 3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 Independence leaders commonly hold a significant place in the history and culture 
of their nations, especially in Africa. Regardless of their intentions, they are often 
remembered as those who fought colonial powers in defense of their nation’s honor and 
sovereignty. Their role in shaping the institutions of their countries earned them the titles 
of founding fathers; a status held in higher respect than subsequent leaders. Does this 
higher level of respect affect the way that citizens react to their rule? Would people 
respond differently to the same policies and leadership had the primary leader not had a 
special reputation or background? 
 Much has been published regarding the significant effects a leadership’s 
reputation has on its constituency and tenure. Many of African politics’ leading scholars 
have written that “founding fathers” of nations receive adoration, trust, and respect above 
what they otherwise would. However, scholars have yet to link this phenomenon to the 
likelihood of civil war incidence.  
 Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) suggest that leaders’ reputations have in fact led 
to an extension of their tenures in office, by explaining that many incumbent leaders won 
votes by appealing to their status as father figures of their nations.36 This implies that 
“father figure” leaders may potentially have experienced earlier exits by democratic 
means at the very least, had it not been for their status. Goren Hyden (2006) adds 
evidence to the argument that reputations matter, when he states that constitutional 
framers were granted more credibility by African citizens, merely by their involvement in 
the creation of their institutions; implying that otherwise their constituents may have 
                                                 
36
 Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), 161.  
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deemed them as unqualified to lead.37 Bratton and Van de Walle further show the status 
and power of former heroes by referring to them as “larger-than-life personas” and 
stating that they were able to set the agenda for African nationalism.38  
 Young and Turner (1985) provide empirical evidence which suggests that former 
heroes use their histories to promote reputations that will further their careers. They focus 
on Mobutu’s story in Zaire.39 Mobutu served a 32 year tenure, after taking control of 
Zaire’s government two separate times. He ingrained his status as a hero of Zaire’s 
independence by naming his party the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR), after 
serving as “an effective commander of the army and as a political arbiter” of the 
revolution.40 Mobutu further manipulated the country into considering his persona as 
“larger than life” by mandating that the media refer to only him by name for a period of 
weeks; the media was required to refer to other officials by their title only.41 The national 
anthem of Zaire was also written to include Mobutu’s name, so that the people tied his 
well-being to that of the nation’s.42  
It is exceedingly difficult to raise support to overthrow a leader when he has a cult 
of personality like Mobutu in Zaire or Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire, even if 
legitimate grievances exist.  
“The fundamental fact about insurgency is that insurgents are weak 
relative to the governments they are fighting, at least at the start of 
operations. If government forces knew who the rebels were and how to 
find them, they would be fairly easily destroyed or captured. This is true 
even in states whose military and police capabilities are low.”43 
                                                 
37
 Goren Hyden (2006). “Big Man Rule,” in African Politics in Comparative Perspective. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 106.  
38
 Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), 25. 
39
 Young and Turner (1985) 
40
 ibid, 176. 
41
 ibid, 169. 
42
 ibid, 170. 
43
 Fearon and Laitin (2003), 79. 
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I assume that when a leader is highly revered, or when the population ties the well-being 
of their nation to that of the leader’s, that there is a higher percentage of the population 
willing to report to authorities “who the rebels are and how to find them.” The increased 
likelihood of the government knowing who and where rebels are is an increase in the 
state’s capacity to repress, and “if the state is capable of repressing, then the likelihood of 
imprisonment, injury, or death will be higher and mobilization will be less likely.”44 
Regan and Norton support this claim by stating that “rebel support will be largely a 
function of the fear of punishment if their support is detected.”45 Not only will rebels be 
less likely to mobilize, but individuals who are on the fence about joining the rebellion 
will likely be deterred from doing so.  
 The example of Zaire, along with the statements quoted above from other notable 
African politics scholars, serve as credible evidence supporting the significance of a 
leader’s national reputation.  
 While it is widely accepted that many things in a state are affected by leadership 
qualities, it is yet to be reported whether or not this effect extends to conflict. Such a 
study is a useful endeavor as conflicts and governments are inextricably linked. The 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset defines civil conflict as “a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force 
between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 
25 battle-related deaths.”46  
                                                 
44
 Hendrix, Cullen S. “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of 
Civil Conflict.” (2009). Web, 1. 
45
 Regan and Norton (2005), 324. 
46
 Gleditsch et al, “UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.” UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. 2009. 
Web, 1. 
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 As civil conflict necessarily involves the government, primary leaders have the 
most to lose in civil war, especially in Africa where leaders have significant control of the 
state; as was said about Houphouët-Boigny: “he was in charge, and everyone knew it.” 
Houphouët-Boigny had enough power that he was able to mandate that Côte d’Ivoire 
focus the entirety of its economy on agriculture and not diversify.47 African leaders also 
have nearly unfettered access to the state’s coffers; which means that they and their 
family can accumulate massive wealth if the state has the ability to effectively tax the 
population. Further, African leaders commonly have the ability to allocate state services 
(as unequally as they might wish), and therefore their home-region or ethnicity gains 
significantly from their position. Leaders who are particularly good at promoting their 
reputation are able to portray the allocation of state services as “a personal gift from the 
president.”48 Filling the position of primary leader in Africa typically allows one to 
monopolize power, as well as become exceedingly wealthy and share that wealth with 
their kin and preferred constituents.  
 Having so much to lose puts leaders in a situation in which they must be 
inherently concerned with the ramifications of civil war. Regardless of what motivations 
a group has to rebel, or if those motivations have anything to do with complaints about 
the leadership, it is the primary leader who stands to lose vast wealth and power. Even if 
the state triumphs in a civil war, the army will likely suffer casualties and therefore be 
less likely to succeed in a subsequent war. If the state loses a civil war, the rebel group 
will likely assume power, punish the leader, and take control of the states’ finances; 
leaving the leader and those that he supported with no income. Thus, to increase the 
                                                 
47
 Payton (1993) 
48
 Young and Turner (1985), 168. 
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likelihood of staying in power, I believe that primary leaders do what they can to 
disincentivize rebellion by promoting their status as “father figures” of the nation. This 
might explain why Mobutu tied his well-being to that of the nations; while disadvantaged 
groups may have wanted to oust Mobutu, they may not have wanted to “attack Zaire” 
itself, which was embodied by Mobutu thanks to his efforts. Evidence that the people of 
Zaire believed that their well-being was contingent upon the leadership of Mobutu is 
beholden in the following quote from the 1970 MPR Congress: 
 
Only one man, previously noted for his outstanding services to his 
country, can assure the well-being of each one of us and create the 
conditions propitious of the people’s moral and spiritual growth, and offer 
them a common ideal, the feelings of a joint destiny and the knowledge of 
belonging to one country.49 
 
 
I posit that a rebel group’s sentiment toward the leader is at least one of the 
variables weighed in the decision of rebel groups to take up arms, as a successful 
rebellion will have dire consequences for the leader. Therefore it follows, that a leader 
who is held in high esteem by the populace is less likely to experience attempted 
uprisings against his government than his counterparts, who lack this high regard.  
In order to explain why this phenomenon exists, it is essential to first lay out who 
the major actors in civil conflict are. In this thesis, I categorize the participants of civil 
war into four groups; each acting as a unitary actor. The first major actor is the 
administration of the primary leader, which focuses on the primary leader, but also 
includes those in posts that surround and support him, as these top tier positions are often 
filled by direct appointments by the leader.  
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In this thesis, I will focus on primary leaders who played visible roles in their 
nations’ independence movements. While the majority of the focus will be on the primary 
leaders, it can be assumed that many of the other major governmental posts are also held 
by former freedom fighters, as nepotism is more the rule than the exception in newly 
independent states, and state leaders are likely to pick those who have “paid their dues” 
or proven loyalty to them.  
The second major actor is what I will refer to as the “grievance group,” which is 
the core group of citizens which seeks to challenge the administration. Any group which 
feels it is being unduly oppressed for a common trait that they share would be identified 
as a grievance group, but will most likely identify itself by ethnic, religious, linguistic, 
regional, or economic means.  
The third group consists of the political entrepreneurs, those who use their 
leadership skills to organize the grievance group as a means of reaching political power. 
Political entrepreneurs solve the coordination problem that individuals with shared 
grievances commonly come across, and enable those individuals to become a unitary 
actor. Political entrepreneurs gain from coordinating grievance groups, because they are 
the most likely individuals to take office if the rebellion is successful.50 It is interesting to 
note that if this ascension to power does take place; the political entrepreneur’s title will 
incorporate the identity of a former freedom fighter or national hero. It is for this reason 
that political entrepreneurs might “exaggerate the hostility of others and magnify the 
likelihood of conflict.”51  
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The final group of actors is the otherwise neutral public, citizens who do not 
belong to the grievance group. These neutral citizens can choose to join the government’s 
side, the rebellion’s side, or to remain neutral. Recruitment of these citizens is essential 
for either side to stand a chance of succeeding in the civil war. The longevity of civil war 
necessitates that both sides have access to soldiers and financing, which are provided by 
persuading otherwise neutral citizens to support their causes.52  
All four groups are essential elements to civil war, for without one of them the 
war would not take place. By definition, a civil war must include violence between the 
government and opposition forces from within the state (referred to as the grievance 
group in this article.) Without political entrepreneurs the grievance group will fail to 
coordinate and mobilize. Without support and assistance from otherwise neutral citizens 
the grievance group will neither have the manpower nor financial means to succeed in 
war.  
Are these actors less likely to violently clash when an independence leader is in 
office? I contend that the persona and reputation of an independence leader acting as the 
primary leader are significant enough to convince one of the other three actors to remain 
at peace. Four possible decisions of “non-actions” will be discussed.  
 
H1: Grievance groups are less likely to form when an independence leader is the 
primary leader of the state 
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When an independence leader is in power, grievance groups are less likely to 
form; this is the first non action that might take place. Grievances are more likely to be 
overlooked when the leader has a reputation that is highly revered and associated with the 
founding of the state. This is the result of the extra credit that is given to those leaders 
that shaped constitutions, as explained by Hyden earlier in this thesis.53 Upset citizens are 
more likely to assume that the national hero’s failure to solve their problems means that 
nobody could succeed in doing so. This is supported by Zaire’s 1970 MPR Congressional 
statement that “only one man… can assure the well-being of each one of us.”54 It is also 
likely that those who have grievances do not feel that it is justified, or even feel that it is 
treasonous, to rise against a leader whose reputation is so closely tied to that of the 
nation, such as Mobutu in Zaire. The link between rebelling and treason is more easily 
understood when considering that Mobutu’s nicknames in the media and the public 
consisted of “Guide of the Zairian Revolution, the Helmsman, Father of the Nation, [and] 
Founding President.”55 
The lack of a grievance group then means that political entrepreneurs have no 
group to mobilize, and therefore are not able to act.  
If grievance groups do exist, political entrepreneurs may choose not to act for the 
same reasons that were just explained for the grievance groups. This is the second 
possible non-action.  
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H2: Political entrepreneurs are less likely to organize rebellions when an 
independence leader is the primary leader of the state  
 
If grievance groups arise, and there are political entrepreneurs willing to take the 
risks involved in coordinating them, a civil war movement will cease to exist if the 
expectations of victory are low for the rebelling group. If grievance groups and political 
entrepreneurs know that their chances of winning are low, they will not even attempt to 
recruit from the public at large. As discussed earlier in this thesis, recruiting increases the 
number of individuals who know that a grievance group is planning a rebellion, and 
increased reverence for the leader increases the likelihood that one of those individuals 
will report those intentions. As the previously cited quote from Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
explains, even weak states will have the ability to destroy an insurgency if it can engage 
them during the recruitment phase.56 The decision to not recruit is the third possible non-
action. War theorists have already shown that war is less likely when a gap in military 
capabilities is evident.57 Rebel groups will not foolishly revolt, or signal the possibility of 
a revolt by recruiting from the public, when their defeat is imminent and their goals are 
not likely to be reached.  
 
H3: Rebel groups are less likely to signal their intentions by recruiting when an 
independence leader is the primary leader of the state 
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Why would rebel groups expect their likelihood of victory to be lower when the 
state is led by an independence leader? One possibility is that many independence leaders 
were also revolutionary leaders, as some states had to fight wars for sovereignty. 
Freedom fighters by definition have experienced a similar conflict and are war tested. 
The freedom fighter’s place in government necessarily implies that they have previously 
been victorious in conflict, and therefore have sufficient knowledge of how to fight on 
that territory. Formerly victorious freedom fighters that obtain the position of primary 
leader are most often those that were not only soldiers, but leaders in their revolutions 
(probably the political entrepreneurs of their revolution.) This previous military 
leadership further increases the primary leader’s expected military capacity. However, it 
is duly noted that not all independence leaders were freedom fighters, revolutionary 
heroes, or engaged in military conflict in any dimension.  
There are reasons why a primary leader has a greater ability to recruit than the 
rebel groups. Because political leaders often control the media and most modes of 
communication, their ability to recruit is likely to be greater than insurgencies’. 
“President Slobodan Milosevic’s control over the media in Serbia, for instance, allowed 
him to present a one-sided view of the Croat violence toward Croatian Serbs.”58 
Mobutu’s sway over the media is evidenced by the fact that “the press carried a front-
page photograph of [him] nearly every day.”59 Administrations are also likely to have the 
capacity to conscribe citizens to the national military, surely increasing its expected 
military capabilities. These two reasons explain how primary leaders have greater 
recruitment capacity than rebel groups; however, for it to have any utility to this thesis, I 
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must show how recruitment makes independence leaders less likely to experience civil 
conflict than non independence leaders.  
A former independence leader is more likely to successfully recruit than 
subsequent leaders, on the basis of holding a “father figure” status. The most compelling 
example of this is Houphouët-Boigny, who was still affectionately referred to as “Papa” 
thirty years into his reign, despite Côte d’Ivoire’s economy and political stability 
declining considerably throughout the 1980s.60  Admittedly, this is only a theoretical 
claim, as it is impossible to know the counterfactual; Côte d’Ivoire did not experience 
any civil wars during Houphouët-Boigny’s tenure, and therefore he did not have to recruit 
a defensive force. With that said, I assume that the public is more likely to defend “father 
figures” of their nation than subsequent leaders.  
 Even if grievance groups and political entrepreneurs decide that they have a 
decent chance of victory, and that the administration will fail to recruit large segments of 
the public, the public can still choose to not support either side of the conflict. The 
decision of the public to remain neutral is the fourth possible non-action that would 
prevent the onset of civil war.  
 
H4: The public is less likely to support a revolution when an independence leader is 
the primary leader of the state 
 
Recruiting from a neutral public is assuredly more difficult when the public views 
the leader as a symbol of their nation. I give two reasons why this might be. First, citizens 
may consider it treasonous to rebel against something that symbolizes the nation; much 
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like why people are offended by the sight of flag burning. The second, more rational 
reason is that the public may fear the rebellion will be unsuccessful and therefore decide 
not to act. If the rebellion fails, anyone involved, even if only financially, will likely be 
punished by the administration.61 Citizens who lack grievances are less likely to take the 
same risks as citizens who do have grievances, as the benefits from success are 
inconsistent between the two groups. As stated before, if the public remains neutral by 
withholding their financial and military resources, grievance groups and political 
entrepreneurs will lack the capability to launch a civil war. If they attempt to fight 
without the support of the public, they will be easily defeated and their efforts will be 
classified as a minor uprising or unrest.  
 The involvement of all four actors is necessary for grievances to escalate into a 
civil war. The persona and reputation of an independence leader acting as the primary 
leader is significant enough that it will succeed in convincing at least one of the other 
actors to not revolt against it.  
In order to test the effect that a leader’s reputation has on rebellion, it is necessary 
to find a proxy that is consistent. As is shown from the cited literature above, 
revolutionary heroes, founding fathers, and father figures of states are typically held in 
far higher regard than their subsequent heads of state. I will therefore empirically test 
whether or not countries that are led by leaders of their independence movement are less 
likely to experience civil war.  
 
H5: Countries whose primary leaders served as leaders of their independence 
movements are less likely to experience civil war  
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CHAPTER 4. CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 In this study, I will focus on testing Hypothesis 5; the other hypotheses will 
remain the topics of future research. 
 
H5: Countries whose primary leaders served as leaders of their independence 
movements are less likely to experience civil war 
  
In order to test this hypothesis, I need a sample of primary leaders; some of whom 
were independence leaders and some of whom were not. I test whether or not those that 
were classified as independence leaders were less likely to experience civil war.  
The unit of analysis in this study is leader-year. The set of cases are the 47 
mainland African countries as well as Cape Verde, Comoros, Mauritius, and Madagascar, 
from their year of independence until 2004. The study stops at 2004 due to data 
limitations; however, I do not have reason to believe that subsequent years would 
substantially change the results of this test.  
The cases are limited to Africa to provide for consistency and for the practical 
purpose of obtaining all necessary data within a limited time frame. Limiting the sample 
to Africa provides consistency because it rules out many regional variables such as 
climate, terrain, and neighbors. African countries are also consistent because all but 
Liberia were formerly European colonies, and the strong majority earned independence 
between the late 1950s and 1970s.62 While I believe that the results of this study will also 
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have implications for the way we understand leadership outside of Africa, further 
research will be necessary to validate this belief.  
To test these data, I ran a logistic binary time-series-cross-section (BTSCS) 
analysis using STATA to test the impact that independence leaders had on civil war 
incidence probability, controlling for the below mentioned variables.  
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CHAPTER 5. VARIABLES AND OPERATIONALIZATION 
5.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 The dependent variable for this hypothesis is the incidence of civil war. The 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset was used to collect data for civil war, as well as for 
the definition of civil war.63  
“UCDP defines conflict as: ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two 
parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 
25 battle-related deaths.’”64 
 
The set of conflicts used in this study were those classified as in the region of Africa and 
as being “internal” or “internationalized internal” in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset. This means that cases that took place outside of Africa or were classified as 
“extrasystemic” or “interstate” were omitted from the dataset.  
 A dichotomous variable for civil war was created for whether or not a civil war 
took place during a leader’s reign for every leader-year. A 1 denotes that a civil war took 
place with the government during that year. A 0 denotes that no civil war with the 
government took place for that year.65  
 
5.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 The independent variable for this hypothesis is dichotomous, and measures 
whether each primary leader is an independence leader or not. There are times when there 
is ambiguity as to who is the effective leader of a state. I coded individuals as primary 
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leaders based solely on the coding of the ARCHIGOS dataset in order to remain 
consistent with the field’s lead scholars.66  
A dichotomous variable was created for whether or not each leader was an 
independence leader. Primary leaders that were independence leaders are denoted by a 1, 
while those who were not independence leaders are denoted by a 0. Independence leaders 
were coded as such so long as there was credible evidence that the individual played a 
leadership role in their state’s independence movement. In most cases an individual’s 
involvement (or lack thereof) in an independence movement was rather clear; usually 
leadership in an independence movement was plainly noted by either the ARCHIGOS 
case studies or the Dictionary of African Historical Biography. For all other cases, Lexis-
Nexis searches were conducted; articles were found that either described the individual’s 
involvement in the independence movement, or labeled them as an independence leader, 
leader of the independence movement, or leader of the independence party.67 Most often 
these articles were first published in American or British newspapers.68  
Of the 2119 post-independence leader-years in this sample, 715 are coded as 
during an independence leader’s reign (33.7%). As of 2004, the longest reign for an 
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independence leader was Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, who had been in power for 36 
years. The next longest tenures were Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire with 33 years 
and Mobutu in Zaire with 32 years. The shortest tenures for independence leaders were 
the seven leaders removed from power in their first year, including Ben Khedda and Bitat 
in Algeria and Andom in Ethiopia. It is worth noting that these seven leaders represent 
only four countries69, and six of them were removed from power by a different 
independence leader; only Abdallah of Comoros was not. The average length of tenure 
for independence leaders in this sample is 12 years.  
 
5.3 CONTROL VARIABLES 
To fully test the hypothesis, I needed to take into account the variety of factors 
that affect both the dependent and independent variables. Most of these variables are 
factors that are commonly seen as civil war determinants and are more likely to have 
been prevalent in the 1980s (when many civil wars occurred) than in the 1960s (when 
most independence leaders were in power).   
 Most African states gained independence in the 1960s and 1970s, a time when 
states were much stronger, as well as more likely to have an independence leader heading 
their government. The 1980s were a time of diminished state strength, as well as a time 
when it is reasonably expected that some of the leaders will have previously left office. 
“Real income per head in much of sub-Saharan Africa grew rapidly in the 1960s, but 
faltered following the first OPEC oil price shock in 1973-74, and then stagnated or fell 
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from the late 1970s to the early 1990s.”70  The 1980s were also a time of institutional 
transition, as the 1960s saw a large quantity of authoritarian regimes in Africa, which 
contrasts with the higher quantity of democracies of the 1990s.71 I control for state 
strength using a logged Real Gross Domestic Product per capita in 1996 dollars as a 
proxy. 
 “(Log) GDP per capita is highly correlated with a variety of measures of 
bureaucratic/administrative capacity… and may be plausibly considered 
both a cause and effect of bureaucratic quality and strong state 
institutions.”72   
 
GDP per capita is unlikely to have an affect on whether or not an inaugural leader is an 
independence leader. However, I assume that independence leaders in more wealthy 
countries have more power to appoint the next primary leader. I also assume that 
constituents of independence leaders in richer countries are more likely to welcome other 
independence leaders into executive leadership, than constituents of poorer countries. 
This assumption follows the belief that individuals who are financially stable are 
generally more satisfied with their current government.   
As this study is at least partially testing the effect that a leader’s “father figure” 
status has on the public, I control for leaders’ ages assuming that older leaders are more 
likely to carry such a reputation. Similarly, I assume that the longer one is in office the 
more likely they are to be seen as a father figure; therefore I control this with a variable 
measuring how many years each leader has been in office. 
 Weak democratic governance increases the likelihood of civil war, and also 
influences leadership. Societies in states with less democratic values are less likely to 
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bear grievances with a leader declaring himself “leader for life,” or otherwise finding a 
way to hold power for two or three decades.73 Also, democratic governance is likely to 
affect whether or not an independence leader is replaced by another independence leader 
when the first leaves office.74 States that are fully authoritarian are more likely to accept 
the appointment of a loyal member of the leader’s party as the subsequent leader. I 
control for democracy using Polity IV’s Polity 2 variable. Polity 2 is a measure of 
democracy ranging from -10 (completely authoritarian) to 10 (completely democratic).  
 Similarly, political instability is a factor that is seen as a determinant of civil war 
and influences leadership. I do not expect that power transfers in unstable political arenas 
are likely to go from one individual to a member of his own party. The correlation 
between political instability and leadership change can be explained in either causal 
direction: instability is likely to cause the desire for change, and the desire for change is 
likely to cause instability. Either way, I assume that independence leaders during unstable 
times are likely to experience conflict and to be followed by a non-independence leader 
(or an independence leader who is now a rival; however the empirical evidence suggests 
that in Africa it is common for the independence party to rule for an extended period of 
time.) A dummy variable was created for political instability using the Polity 2 variable 
in the Polity IV dataset.75 A 1 represents political instability, and denotes a leader-year in 
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which the Polity 2 score changed by a value three or more; whereas a 0 denotes years in 
which the political system (and therefore the Polity 2 score) was relatively stable.76  
 Military power is used as a proxy to control for the state’s capacity to repress. In 
this study, military power is measured by military personnel from the Correlates of War 
Project.77 As military power is not linearly related to military personnel, it was necessary 
to create a variable measuring the natural log of military personnel. To further explain, 
consider a military increasing its personnel by 100 men. A military would be increasing 
its power by a significantly greater margin if its starting point is 250 men than if its 
starting point is 250,000 men.   
Using military personnel as a proxy was chosen over military expenditures as 
expenditures are expected to increase rapidly once the threat of rebellion is perceived. 
Therefore military expenditures and civil war are likely to be highly correlated, however 
the causal direction is disputable. Military personnel is also likely to increase with the 
threat of rebellion, however I assume that this is a slower process.  
The robustness of this study is checked by testing the effect of three factors; 
European colonizer, African region, and inaugural leadership. Which European country 
colonized a state logically affects who becomes the primary leader as well as the 
likelihood of civil conflict, as each country impacted (and in some cases framed) the 
political institutions and norms of their colonies.  
African region is added to test robustness as regional factors are likely to affect 
both leadership and civil conflict incidence. Controlling for being in a particular region 
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takes into account the possibility of, for example, West African states being especially 
prone to both civil strife and the veneration of independence leaders.  
Inaugural leadership is highly correlated with independence leadership, as the 
majority of inaugural leaders are coded as independence leaders. A robustness test will 
ensure that I am not simply showing the effect that inaugural leadership has on the 
likelihood of civil conflict incidence.  
  Finally, to “correct for duration dependence,”78 and to control for autocorrelation, 
I include a measure of the number of years that the country has been at peace and three 
cubic splines. The variable for peace years measures the number of consecutive years 
without the occurrence of a civil war. Accounting for duration dependence is important 
because the probability of civil war is likely to be much higher immediately following a 
previous civil war and then decline. For example; if Country A has been at peace for 2 
years, and Country B has been at peace for 25 years, it is less likely Country A will make 
it through its 3rd year without civil war than Country B will make it through its 26th year. 
Without controlling for duration dependence, the analysis could violate the assumption 
that errors are uncorrelated.   
The following table displays descriptive statistics for the variables discussed in 
this thesis.  
 
 
 
                                                 
78
 Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker. Beyond Ordinary Logit: Taking Time Seriously 
in Binary Time-series-cross-section Models. Beyond Ordinary Logit: Taking Time Seriously in 
Binary Time-series-cross-section Models. California Institute of Technology. Web, 15.  
 
  
33
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Civil War 2119 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Independence Leader 2119 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Inaugural Leader 2119 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Real GDP per capita 2049 1522.31 1997.60 88.48 17986.24 
Leaders Age 2117 54.00 12.24 18 92 
Tenure Year 2119 9.05 7.75 1 38 
Democracy 2082 -3.75 5.42 -10 10 
Military Personnel 1909 33.95 68.42 0 466 
Political Instability 2068 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Peace Years 2119 11.48 11.44 0 54 
 
Civil War’s mean of 0.17 tells us that civil war occurred in about one out of every six 
leader-years in this study. Approximately one third of all primary leaders in this sample 
are coded as independence leaders, and slightly more than one quarter are coded as 
inaugural leaders. I provide the cases that coincide with the following minimums and 
maximums to provide reference points for the reader. The maximum GDP per capita in 
the sample is Mauritius, in 2004, with $17,986.24. The minimum GDP per capita is 
Tanzania, in 1961, with the average person earning less than $100 that year. The eldest 
leader in the sample is Siad Barre in Somalia, in 2004, at the age of 92. Finally, the 
longest duration of peace in the sample is Egypt, which avoided civil conflict from the 
first year it was coded (1950) through 2004. 
Table 2 is a correlation matrix for the variables used in this study.79 This 
correlation matrix only shows correlation, and does not provide evidence for causal 
direction of substantive correlation. 
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Table 2. Correlation of Variables 
 
The first highly correlated pair of variables in the study worth mentioning is 
independence leaders with inaugural leaders. This correlation means that most 
independence leaders were also the first post-independence leader of their state.80 The 
other highly correlated pair worth noting is peace years with GDP; wealthier states are 
correlated with states that have been at peace for longer periods of time. While 
substantively small, the positive correlation between civil war and large militaries is of 
interest, as the state’s capacity to repress model suggests that states with larger militaries 
should be less likely to experience civil conflict. This correlation will be discussed later 
in the thesis. Lastly, although independence leaders and inaugural leaders are highly 
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Civil 
War 
Independence 
Leader 
Inaugural 
Leader 
GDP 
Per 
Capita 
Leaders 
Age 
Years 
in 
Office Democracy 
Military 
Personnel 
Political 
Instability 
Peace 
Years 
Civil War 1.00          
Independence 
Leader 
-
0.07 1.00         
Inaugural 
Leader 
-
0.18 0.66 1.00        
GDP Per 
Capita 
-
0.10 -0.01 -0.19 1.00       
Leaders Age 
-
0.08 0.18 0.21 0.17 1.00      
Years in 
Office 
-
0.04 0.16 0.07 0.24 0.41 1.00     
Democracy 
-
0.01 -0.13 -0.04 0.19 0.23 -0.20 1.00    
Military 
Personnel 0.15 -0.01 -0.21 0.10 0.00 0.08 -0.12 1.00   
Political 
Instability 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.17 0.13 -0.06 1.00  
Peace Years 
-
0.36 -0.15 -0.19 0.42 0.19 0.25 0.01 0.14 -0.05 1.00 
  
35
correlated, their respective correlations with civil conflict are much different; inaugural 
leaders have a significantly higher correlation with civil war than do independence 
leaders.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
36
CHAPTER 6. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 “A logistic regression model allows us to establish a relationship between a binary 
outcome variable and a group of predictor variables.”81 Here, I report odds ratios. Odds 
ratios are the ratio of the odds of an event occurring in one circumstance to the odds of it 
occurring in another. As an example for one variable in this thesis, the odds ratio will be 
the odds of civil war incidence when an independence leader is in power divided by the 
odds of civil war incidence when a non independence leader is in power.  
To interpret odds ratios, remember that “an odds ratio tells you by how much the 
odds of the dependent variable change for each unit change in the independent 
variable.”82 So, in this case, an odds ratio of 0.2 would mean that a one unit change in the 
variable decreases the odds of civil war incidence by 80%, in any given year; and an odds 
ratio of 1.8 would mean that a one unit change in the variable increased the odds of civil 
war incidence by 80%, in any given year.  
It is necessary to note that the reported percentages below are the percentage 
changes in the odds of civil war incidence, and not the percentage changes in likelihood 
(synonymous with probability) of civil war incidence, as the two are substantially 
different. To help explain, take the following example (the values of which were chosen 
for ease of explanation, not accuracy to this thesis). Take a state in which the likelihood 
of civil war incidence is 75%: the probability is 3 in 4, while the odds are 3 to 1. A 100% 
increase in likelihood would then increase the likelihood to 150% (6/4) (a nonsensical 
number meaning that civil war incidence was guaranteed and a half). A 100% increase in 
the odds would increase the odds to 6:1 (approximately 86% likelihood). Clearly, the 
                                                 
81
 “Annotated Stata Output: Logistic Regression.” UCLA Academic Technology Services. Web. 21 Mar. 
2010. <http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/stata_logistic.htm>. 
82
 Pollock, Philip H. A Stata Companion to Political Analysis. Washington, D.C.: CQ, 2006, 183. 
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difference between 86% and 150% likelihood in this example shows the importance of 
clearly distinguishing whether I am reporting odds or likelihoods. Most important to 
understand here, is that the effect of a percentage change in odds is usually quite less 
substantial than the same nominal percentage change in likelihood.  
 In this thesis I am reporting odds ratios, not likelihood. While coefficients for 
likelihood would tell you exactly how much a one unit change in each variable would 
change the likelihood of civil war incidence (and would be quite useful), the results I 
report using odds ratios are just as valid; meaning the reported significance, effect and 
direction of correlation reported for each variable are adequately described by odds 
ratios. Using odds ratios was beneficial to this thesis because it allowed me to show how 
strongly each variable was associated with civil war incidence relative to the other 
variables. 
 
Table 3. Odds Ratios of Civil War Incidence 
Civil War Odds Ratio (std. err.) 
Independence Leader 0.342*** 0.111 
(Log) GDP per capita 0.907 0.131 
Leaders Age 0.999 0.013 
(Log) Years in Office 1.005 0.182 
Democracy (Polity 2) 0.981 0.029 
(Log) Military Personnel 1.200*** 0.099 
Political Instability 2.636*** 1.061 
(Log) Peace Years 0.767 0.267 
spline 1 1.021*** 0.008 
spline 2 0.995*** 0.002 
spline 3 1.001*** 0.000 
N = 1401                      Pseudo R^2 = 0.1161 
*: Z 0.1 = 1.283.  **: Z 0.05 = 1.645  ***: Z 0.01 = 2.33, one-tailed test, robust standard errors 
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From this, I find that status as an independence leader does have a highly 
statistically significant and negative effect on the likelihood of civil war incidence. 
Having an independence leader serving as the primary leader decreases the odds of civil 
war incidence by 66%, all else being equal. When holding all the control variables 
constant at their mean, a country whose primary leader is an independence leader is 3.3% 
less likely to experience civil conflict than a country whose primary leader is not an 
independence leader, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 1.5 to 5.3 percentage 
points. Because the likelihood of civil war in any given year in any country is quite low, 
this is a statistically significant and substantive effect. Both the percentage change in 
odds and predicted likelihood presented here strongly support Hypothesis 5.  
 Of the control variables, only political instability and military personnel have 
statistically significant effects on the odds of civil war incidence in this regression. Not 
surprisingly, an increase in political instability is associated with increased odds of civil 
war incidence. According to this regression, political instability increases the odds of 
civil war incidence by 164%, all else being equal.   
Interestingly, this test shows that states with more populous militaries are more 
likely to face rebellions, which seems to contradict the state’s capacity to repress 
argument. However, an increase in GDP per capita (my measure for the state’s capacity 
to repress) is negatively correlated with civil war incidence, which supports the state’s 
capacity argument. 
 To see how great of an effect logged military personnel has on the odds of civil 
war incidence, I computed two numbers for substantive significance. The substantive 
significance of a one unit increase in an independent variable is that variable’s odds ratio, 
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the substantive significance of a two unit increase in an independence variable is its odds 
ratio squared, and so on.83 Therefore, to find the total significance of logged military 
personnel, I took the odds ratio (1.2) to the power of the total variation of logged military 
personnel. The product of this calculation is the percentage change in odds of civil war 
incidence for states with the lowest value of logged military personnel and states with the 
highest value of logged military personnel in any given year, all else being equal. This 
computation shows that a state with military personnel equivalent to the largest value in 
the sample’s (Egypt in 1984 where the armed forces included 466,000 fighters) odds of 
civil war incidence are two times greater than a state with the smallest military in the 
sample (which is zero). Since this is admittedly a very large gap, I then did the same 
computation measuring from the mean of the logged military variable to the largest value. 
This shows that a state with a military equivalent to 466,000 soldiers’ odds of civil war 
incidence is 95% greater than a state that has an average sized military for this sample 
(equivalent to Mozambique’s army in 1984 which had 34,000 soldiers), in any given 
year, all else being equal. Clearly, an increased military has a substantial and positive 
effect on the odds of civil war incidence.84  
The other control variables are statistically insignificant in this regression; 
however, their substantive effects are worth noting. As stated above, GDP per capita is 
negatively correlated with civil war incidence in this regression, implying that wealthier 
countries are less likely to experience civil conflict.  
                                                 
83
 The equation for substantive significance is “odds ratio^n” where “n” is how many units the independent 
variable is changing.  
84
 Possible explanations for the strength of this effect will be discussed in the next section. As a robustness 
test, the same regression was run using logged military personnel per capita which yielded nearly identical 
results for all variables. When running the regression with military personnel per capita (not logged), the 
results were less substantive, yet still statically significant and positively correlated with civil war onset 
(odds ratio of 1.036 with a standard error of 0.02 and a z score of 1.54); the other variables remained nearly 
identical.  
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The duration of peace has a strong substantive negative effect on civil war. This 
regression shows that each year of peace decreases the odds of civil war incidence by 
23%. The three splines are statistically significant in this regression, and will be 
statistically significant in the following two robustness tests. The splines suggest that the 
regressions are showing some temporal pattern to civil conflict incidence. With the 
information at hand, however, I cannot conclude what this pattern is.  
This regression shows that civil conflict is less likely in more democratic states. 
Leader’s age and years in office are not correlated with civil war incidence in this 
regression, as their odds ratios are very close to 1.  
The regression adding European colonizer does not substantively change the 
reported effect of any of the variables. When adding a spatial lag for African region, all 
values remain substantively the same, except for a minor change in the odds ratio for 
logged years in office (which decreases by 0.09). This suggests that the test is robust in 
respect to these factors.  
 To further test for robustness, I ran the regression restricting the sample to only 
non-inaugural leaders, as many independence leaders were the first primary leaders of 
their state after independence. This was essential to ensure that I was in fact testing the 
significance of being an independence leader, and not only testing the effects of being the 
inaugural leader of a post-independence state. Inaugural leaders might also have been less 
likely to face civil war if their constituencies were united around their newly found 
sovereignty, and I feared that the strong correlation between inaugural leaders and 
independence leaders would affect the results of my regressions.  
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Table 4. Odds Ratios of Civil War Incidence for Non Inaugural Leaders 
Civil War Odds Ratio (std. err.) 
Independence Leader 0.587 0.268 
(Log) GDP per capita 0.829 0.141 
Leaders Age 1.004 0.014 
(Log) Years in Office 0.944 0.176 
Democracy (Polity 2) 0.976 0.033 
(Log) Military Personnel 1.113 0.098 
Political Instability 2.857*** 1.259 
(Log) Peace Years 0.534** 0.169 
spline 1 1.018*** 0.008 
spline 2 0.995*** 0.002 
spline 3 1.001*** 0.000 
N = 998                       Pseudo R^2 = 0.1250 
*: Z 0.1 = 1.283.  **: Z 0.05 = 1.645  ***: Z 0.01 = 2.33, robust standard errors 
 
For non inaugural leaders, status as an independence leader is not statistically 
significant, as the standard error is too high. However, if I disregard the standard error, 
this regression shows that the independence leader variable has a substantial effect on the 
dependent variable, despite losing 1/3 of the cases. As for control variables, political 
instability remained as a statistically significant predictor of civil conflict.  When not 
being led by an inaugural leader, states’ odds of civil war incidence are 186% greater 
during a period of political instability than during a period of political stability, in any 
given year, all else being equal.  Peace years are also statistically significant when I 
restrict the sample to only non inaugural leaders. Not surprisingly, the longer a country is 
at peace, the more likely it is to remain at peace.  
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Table 5. Odds Ratios of Civil War Incidence for Inaugural Leaders 
Civil War Odds Ratio (std. err.) 
Independence Leader 0.245** 0.192 
(Log) GDP per capita 1.240 0.511 
Leaders Age 0.967 0.038 
(Log) Years in Office 1.912 1.278 
Democracy (Polity 2) 0.999 0.115 
(Log) Military Personnel 1.632* 0.603 
Political Instability - - 
(Log) Peace Years 1.556 0.973 
spline 1 1.057*** 0.021 
spline 2 0.976*** 0.010 
spline 3 1.015** 0.007 
N = 390                       Pseudo R^2 = 0.1808 
*: Z 0.1 = 1.283.  **: Z 0.05 = 1.645  ***: Z 0.01 = 2.33, robust standard errors 
 
When I run the regression for only inaugural leaders, only independence leaders 
and military personnel are statistically significant. For states led by inaugural leaders, the 
odds of civil war incidence decrease by 75% when an independence leader is the primary 
leader of the state in any given year, all else being equal. Real GDP per capita, leader’s 
age, years in office, democracy, and peace years are not statistically significant in this 
regression. (In the next section, I will discuss logged GDP per capita’s positive 
correlation with civil war incidence in this regression.) 
 Similarly to logged GDP per capita, the peace years variable has the opposite 
directional effect in Table 5 than it does in Tables 3 and 4. This means that inaugural 
leaders become increasingly more likely to experience civil war as time goes on. (This 
will also be discussed in the next section). 
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 I conducted the same calculations for substantive significance of military 
personnel for this regression, as I did for the initial regression. Similarly, increased 
militaries show a substantive and positive correlation with civil war incidence [a state led 
by an inaugural leader’s odds of civil war incidence is 13 times greater with a military 
equivalent to the largest in the sample (Eritrea in 1999 which had an army of 215,000 
soldiers) than had it had a military of 0, and 4.5 times greater than when employing a 
military equivalent to the mean of this sample (Cameroon in 1975 with a military of 
10,000 soldiers.)]  
Political instability perfectly predicted failure and was therefore removed from the 
regression. This means that STATA removed political instability because for inaugural 
leaders, instability (as measured by Polity) was always during times of peace, and 
therefore never associated with civil conflict. This peculiar outcome will be discussed in 
the next section. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
7.1 IMPLICATIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
My result that an independence leader is significantly less likely to experience 
civil war than his non-independence leader counterpart is a positive finding for 
Hypothesis 5. This positive finding has significant implications for the field of civil 
conflict research. The finding adds understanding to the phenomena of many African 
leaders enjoying lengthy and uncontested tenures, despite there being several civil war 
determinants in existence at the time; Mobutu in Zaire is a prime example. The results 
also provide useful knowledge about the states that are still led by independence leaders, 
such as Zimbabwe and Libya. Zimbabwe is in dismal shape both economically and 
politically, and this conclusion helps explain why grievance groups have not yet chosen 
to revolt against Mugabe. However, perhaps most importantly, this new information 
provides scholars and policy makers with knowledge to use in the future.  
 The positive result of this hypothesis is useful for our future understanding of the 
world as new states are likely to continue emerging, and relationships with their leaders 
will be established. While it would be difficult (and rather pointless) to predict which 
separatist movements will succeed, it is worth considering how to best relate with future 
leaders that will hold the status of “founding father” of their nation, and how to avoid 
promoting cults of personality as the west did with Robert Mugabe.  
If the international community is truly dedicated to democracy and human rights, 
it will be essential to avoid promoting the development of cults of personality. As can be 
seen in the examples of Zimbabwe, Zaire, and Côte d’Ivoire, it is not difficult for a leader 
to declare himself leader for life after his reputation has developed into a cult of 
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personality. Leaders for life often mandate the suppression of minority groups and 
political opposition. As this study has shown, these oppressed groups do not have the 
option of rebelling violently to reclaim their rights, as waging war against an 
independence leader is seemingly too difficult.  
The seeming impossibility for grievance groups to rise against independence 
leaders is not meant to imply that the international community should want or promote 
more civil wars. Rather, the international community should acknowledge that it is these 
specific cases that warrant the most attention; especially during times of election to 
ensure that basic human rights and dignities are being respected.  
 
7.2 IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTROL VARIABLES 
Military personnel, political instability, and peace years were the only control 
variables that were statistically significant predictors in the study. Military personnel 
could be explained by reverse causality, as knowledge of a forthcoming civil war will 
cause the state to increase its military capacity to ward off the oncoming attack. Reverse 
causality is especially likely because the test is measuring civil war incidence, and 
military personnel is assuredly higher in years 2, 3, 4 (etc.) of a civil war than in the years 
preceding a war.  
The inconsistent correlation between political instability and civil war is 
perplexing. When testing for the entire sample, or only for non inaugural leaders, my test 
shows that civil conflicts are more likely during politically unstable times. This is less 
than surprising as a correlation in both causal directions is expected. Civil conflict often 
leads to regime change, and the Polity 2 score is likely to change with any major 
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governmental transition (especially if it is by violent means). Likewise, drastic political 
change can logically lead to civil conflict, as those that recently lost power might fight to 
win it back.  
Far more perplexing is why a less stable government is more likely to be 
associated with peace when an inaugural leader is in power. I believe that this can be 
explained by noting that only 13 observations were dropped, meaning that of the 403 
years an inaugural leader was in power in Africa, only 13 of those years are considered to 
be politically unstable. As many of the inaugural leaders were independence leaders, I 
believe this supports my central thesis. Inaugural leaders (and therefore independence 
leaders) were far less likely to have groups within their state creating instability in the 
system. Using a consistent definition of political instability, this means that these leaders 
were less likely to have a new regime quickly enter power and drastically make the 
system more or less democratic. This would likely require a successful rebellion, leading 
to a stronger claim that independence leaders are less likely to face rebellions.  
This argument is supported by the empirical cases in the study. Of the inaugural 
leaders, 24% (11/46)85 faced civil wars. Of the inaugural leaders that did not lead 
independence movements, 27% (3/11) faced civil wars. Of the inaugural leaders that 
were independence leaders, only 23% (8/35) were involved in civil conflict during their 
tenure.  This supports the claim that independence leaders are less likely to face civil 
wars. 
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 The five states that do not have a primary leader coded as the “inaugural leader” are Tunisia, South 
Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Liberia. Liberia does not have an inaugural leader in this sample as they were 
never colonized. The other four do not have an inaugural leader in this sample as I only included primary 
leaders whose tenures began after independence, and the primary leader in these states at the time of 
independence had began their tenures prior to independence.  
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This argument is also supported by Table 4, which shows that even for non 
inaugural leaders, countries led by independence leaders’ odds of civil war incidence are 
41% less than the odds of countries led by non independence leaders, in any given year, 
all else being equal. This tells us that the initial regression is showing more than just the 
significance of inaugural leaders; rather, it is showing that independence leaders are less 
likely to experience civil war than their counterparts as my hypothesis predicted. Table 4 
also shows that for non inaugural leaders, the odds of civil war incidence are 180% 
greater during politically instable years than stable years, all else being equal. This is in 
stark contrast to when inaugural leaders are in power, in which civil war and political 
instability never occurred in the same year. Once again, I believe that this is because the 
existence of an independence leader serving as the primary leader promotes stability, as 
they are less likely to face challenges from within the state.  
While changing democracy scores are statistically significant determinants of 
civil war incidence, this study shows that democracy is not. The relationship between 
democracy and conflict is likely to be an inverted U; meaning that conflict is less likely in 
strong authoritarian systems or strong democratic systems, and is more likely when the 
political system sits in the middle of the spectrum.86  
My proxy for state strength, logged real GDP per capita, is not statistically 
significant in any of the three regressions. This implies that civil conflict is less likely to 
be a result of lacking state strength, and more about the persona of the leader, who is able 
to project the image of strength. However, it is worth noting that despite the lack of 
significant effect that this variable has, logged GDP per capita does show a substantive 
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 Regan and Norton (2005), 331. While the “inverted U” theory has been tested by others in the field, it 
has not been tested for this sample, and should be a test for future research.  
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effect on the dependent variable. In Tables 3 and 4, GDP per capita is negatively 
correlated with civil war incidence, meaning that as expected, states with higher GDP per 
capita are less likely to experience civil conflict. However, quite shockingly, when 
restricting the sample to only inaugural leaders, GDP per capita is positively correlated 
with civil conflict. I believe that this is likely the result of the quality of life (or at least 
financial success) during colonialism. Countries with lower GDP per capita during their 
inaugural leader’s tenure are likely to have had lower GDP per capita during colonialism. 
Therefore, independence is more likely to be a welcome change in those states, than in 
states in which the public was better off financially during colonialism. I postulate that 
the “welcome change” in these relatively poorer states make them less likely to have 
experienced civil conflict during their inaugural leader’s tenure.87  
The duration of peace is negatively correlated with civil conflict when using the 
entire sample, or only looking at non-inaugural leaders. This is not surprising as 
grievance groups are more likely to exist and be mobilized shortly after a conflict than 
long after one. However, when restricting the sample to only inaugural leaders, duration 
of peace is suddenly associated with a higher likelihood of civil war incidence. I suspect 
that this means that there is a certain “grace period” for inaugural leaders resulting from 
the unifying force of new sovereignty.88  
 Logged years in office and leaders age are neither significantly nor substantively 
correlated with civil conflict incidence in my test. This suggests either that “father figure” 
statuses have little to do with civil conflict incidence, or that I have failed to appropriately 
proxy for “father figure” status.  
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 A formal test linking GDP per capita and how constituencies respond to inaugural leaders is left to be the 
topic of future research.  
88
 This would be an excellent topic of future research.  
  
49
7.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
 This study was limited to testing Hypothesis 5, and found that states that are led 
by independence leaders are in fact less likely to experience civil war. However, exactly 
what happens within the state to prevent civil war is still unexplained. Future research is 
needed to test the remaining four hypotheses; that one of the unitary actors of civil war 
fails to act as a direct result of the leader’s reputation.  
 The sample of this study was also limited to African states, which are comparable 
on many levels. To verify that Hypothesis 5 extends beyond post-colonial Africa, future 
research using a broader sample is necessary.  
 Future research is also needed to test the validity of the “father figure” 
explanation. Better proxies are needed to measure what extent leaders are viewed as 
father figures to their states. Suggestions for such a proxy are operationalizing media 
references to the leader or how many cities or towns are named after the leader. 
 Testing the “inverted U” theory of democracy and civil conflict for this sample is 
another suggested topic of inquiry.  
I also suggested two avenues of future research to test the effect that inaugural 
leaders have on civil conflict incidence. Specifically, it would be interesting to ask why 
inaugural leaders seem to have the opposite correlation with civil war incidence when it 
comes to GDP per capita and duration of peace. The validity of the “grace period 
explanation” that I brought up for duration of peace could be empirically tested and 
explained in future research.  
 
 
  
50
7.4 CONCLUSION 
 This paper began by asking why Zimbabwe has not yet seen an uprising against 
President Robert Mugabe; and how Mobutu and Houphouët-Boigny experienced 
similarly prolonged tenures in Zaire and Côte d’Ivoire, despite the existence of many 
civil war determinants in their states. I hypothesized that prolonged duration of peace is 
the result of leadership characteristics, specifically that former independence leaders are 
so revered and/or feared by their people that they are less likely experience civil conflict.  
 I believe that independence leaders have an enhanced likelihood of being seen as 
symbols of the state and father figures of their nations by their people. I postulate that this 
elevated status decreases the likelihood that grievance groups and political entrepreneurs 
will blame the state for their misfortune, and therefore will be less likely to wage civil 
conflict. I also contend that even if grievance groups and political entrepreneurs do blame 
the state for their relative deprivation, that the overall public’s reverence for the leader 
will make recruitment exceedingly dangerous, decreasing the likelihood of civil conflict.  
After running empirical tests, I conclude that independence leaders are 
significantly less likely to experience civil conflict than their non independence leader 
counterparts. However, further research is still needed in order to explain this outcome. 
Which group of actors within the state decide not to rebel?  
The results of this thesis, that independence leaders are less likely to face civil 
conflict, provide useful knowledge to the field of civil conflict, even if the underlying 
explanation is still unproven. First, the international community will now have a better 
understanding of the power of independence leaders, and can be more cautious in their 
relations with such leaders, if and when they emerge, in order to avoid the promotion of 
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cults of personality. Also, while the focus of this thesis is on one particular source of 
reverence, independence leadership, the theory might also apply more broadly to other 
leaders who are able to generate personas of great importance and respect. Future 
research might explore the effects that other highly revered leaders have on the likelihood 
of civil conflict incidence.  
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APPENDIX A 
Years of Civil Conflict in Africa89 
 
Country 
Start 
Year 
End Year (or 
ongoing in 
2004) 
 
Country 
Start 
Year 
End Year 
(or ongoing 
in 2004) 
Algeria 1991 ongoing  Liberia 1980 1980 
Angola 1975 2003  Liberia 1989 1995 
Angola 2004 ongoing  Liberia 2000 2003 
Burkina Faso 1987 1987  Madagascar 1971 1971 
Burundi 1965 1965  Mali 1990 1990 
Burundi 1991 1992  Mali 1994 1994 
Burundi 1994 ongoing  Mauritania 1975 1978 
Cameroon 1961 1961  Morocco 1971 1971 
Cameroon 1984 1984  Morocco 1975 1989 
Central African Republic 1996 1997  Mozambique 1977 1992 
Central African Republic 2001 2002  Niger 1991 1992 
Chad 1966 2002  Niger 1994 1994 
Comoros 1989 1989  Niger 1996 1997 
Comoros 1997 1997  Nigeria 1966 1970 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1960 1962  Nigeria 2004 ongoing 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1964 1968  Rwanda 1990 1994 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1977 1978  Rwanda 1997 2002 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1996 2001  Senegal 1990 1990 
Congo, Republic of 1993 1994  Senegal 1992 1993 
Congo, Republic of 1997 1999  Senegal 1995 1995 
Congo, Republic of 2002 2002  Senegal 1997 1998 
Cote d`Ivoire 2002 2004  Senegal 2000 2001 
Djibouti 1991 1994  Senegal 2003 2003 
Djibouti 1999 1999  Sierra Leone 1991 2000 
Equatorial Guinea 1979 1979  Somalia 1978 1978 
Eritrea 1997 1997  Somalia 1982 1996 
Eritrea 1999 1999  Somalia 2001 2002 
Eritrea 2003 2003  Sudan 1963 1972 
Ethiopia 1960 1960  Sudan 1976 1976 
Ethiopia 1964 ongoing  Sudan 1983 ongoing 
Gabon 1964 1964  Togo 1986 1986 
Gambia, The 1981 1981  Togo 1991 1991 
Ghana 1966 1966  Tunisia 1980 1980 
Ghana 1981 1981  Uganda 1971 1972 
Ghana 1983 1983  Uganda 1974 1974 
Guinea 2000 2001  Uganda 1978 1992 
Lesotho 1998 1998  Uganda 1994 ongoing 
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APPENDIX B 
Post-Independence Leaders in Africa 
 
INDEPENDENCE LEADERS 
Algeria Benjedid, Bella, Ben Khedda, Bitat, Bougiaf, Boumedienne, Kafi; Angola: Dos 
Santos, Neto; Botswana: Khama; Burkina Faso: Yameogo; Cameroon: Ahidjo; Cape 
Verde: Pires; Central African Republic: Dacko; Chad: Tombalbaye, Oueddei; Comoros: 
Abdallah; Congo: Youlou; Cote d’Ivoire: Houphouet-Boigny; Democratic Republic of 
Congo: Lumumba, Mobutu, Kasavubu, Laurent Kabila; Djibouti: Gouled Aptidon; 
Equatorial Guinea: Macias Nguema; Eritrea: Afeworki; Ethiopia: Andom, Banti, 
Mengistu Marriam, Selassie; Gabon: Mba; Gambia: Jawara;  
Ghana: Nkrumah; Guinea Bissau: Cabral; Guinea: Toure; Kenya: Kenyatta; Lesotho: 
Jonathan; Libya: Qaddafi; Malawi: Banda; Mali: Keita; Mauritius: Ramgoolam; 
Mozambique: Machel; Namibia: Nujoma; Nigeria: Balewa;  
Senegal: Senghor; Sierra Leone: M. Margai; South Africa: Mandela; Swaziland: Subhuza 
II; Tanzania: Nyerere; Togo: Olympio; Tunisia: Ben Ali Bourguiba; Uganda: Obote; 
Zambia: Kaunda; Zimbabwe; Mugabe;  
 
NON INDEPENDENCE LEADERS 
Algeria: Zerioual, Bouteflika; Benin: Maga, Soglo, Apithy, Congacou, Alley, Zinsou, 
Kouandete, Paul-Emile de Sousa, Ahomadegbe, Kerekou, C. Soglo; Burkina Faso: 
Lamizana, Gerard Kango Ouedraogo, Zerbo, J.P. Ouedraogo, Sankara, Campaore, 
Botswana: Masire, Mogae; Burundi: Mwambutsa, Ntare, Micombero, Bagaza, Buyoya, 
Ndadaye, Ngueze, Kinigi, Ntarymira, Ntibantunganya, Ndayizeye; Cameroon: Biya; 
Cape Verde: Veiga, do Rosario, Neves; Cote d’Ivoire: Konan Bedie, Guei, Laurent 
Gbagbo; Central African Republic: Bokassa, Kolingba, Patasse, Francois Bozize; Chad: 
Malloum, Habre, Deby; Comoros: Soilih, Bob Denard, Djohar, el-Yachroutu, 
Abdoulkarim, Massounde, Azali Assoumani, Hamada Madi; Congo: Debat, Raoul, 
Ngouabi, Opango, Nguesso, Lissouba; Djibouti: Guelleh; Democratic Republic of 
Congo: Joseph Kabila; Egypt: Fuad I, Farouk, Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak; Equatorial 
Guinea: Nguema Mbasogo; Ethiopia: Gebre Kidan, Meles Zenawi; Gabon: Aubaume, 
Bongo; Gambia: Jammeh; Ghana: Ankrah, Afrifa, Busia, Acheampong, Akuffo, 
Rawlings, Limann, John Agyekum Kufuor; Guinea Bissau: Vieira, Mane, Sanha, Kumba 
lala, Correia Seabra, Henrique Pereira Rosa; Guinea: Beavogui, Conte; Kenya: Moi, 
Mwai Kibaki; Liberia: Tubman, Tolbert, Doe, Sawyer, Kpormapkor, Sankawulo, Perry, 
Taylor, Moses Zeh Blah, Bryant; Lesotho: Lekhanya, Ramaema, Mokhehle, Letsie III, 
Mosisili; Mauritania: Ould Daddah, Ould Mohamed Salek, Ould Bouceif, Ould Sidi, 
Ould Ahmed Louly, Ould Haidalla, Sidi Ahmed Taya; Madagascar: Tsiranana, 
Ramanantsoa, Ratsimandrava, Gilles Andriamahazo, Ratsiraka, Zafy, Marc 
Ravalomanana; Mauritius: Anerood Jugnauth, N. Ramgoolam, Paul Berenger; Malawi: 
Muluzi, Bingu wa Mutharika: Mali: Traore, Amadou Toure, Konare; Morocco: 
Mohammed V, Hassan II, Muhammad VI; Mozambique: Chissano; Nigeria: Ironsi, 
Gowon, Ramat Mohammed, Obasanjo, Shagari, Buhari, Babangida, Shonekan, Abacha, 
Abubakar; Niger: Diori, Kountche, Seibou, Ousmane, Mainassara, Wanke, Mamadou; 
Rwanda: Kayibanda, Habyarimana, Sindikubwabo, Paul Kagame; South Africa: Mbeki; 
Senegal: Diouf, Abdoulaye Wade;  
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NON INDEPENDENCE LEADERS - CONTINUED 
Sierra Leone: A. Margai, Lansana, Juxon-Smith, Stevens, Momoh, Strasser, Bio, Kabbah, 
Koroma, Kabbah; Somalia: Osman Daar, Shermarke, Siad Barre; Sudan: Al-Azhari, 
Khalil, Abboud, al-Khalifa, Maghoub, Mahdi, Nimeiri, Osman, Abdul-Rahman 
Swaredahab, Al-Mirghani, Al-Bashir; Swaziland:   Dzeliwe Shongwe, Ntombe Thwala, 
Mswati; Tanzania: Mwinyi, Mkapa; Togo: Grunitzky, Dadjo, Eyadema; Tunisia: Zine 
Al-Abidine Ben Ali; Uganda: Amin, Yusuf Lule, Banaisa, Paulo Muwanga, Obote, 
Okello, Museveni; Zambia: Chiluba, Levy Mwanawasa 
 
INAUGURAL LEADERS 
Algeria: Ben Khedda; Angola: Neto; Benin; Maga; Burkina Faso: Yameogo; Botswana: 
Khama Burundi: Mwambutsa; Cameroon: Ahidjo; Cape Verde: Peres; Cote d’Ivoire: 
Houphouet-Boigny; Central African Republic: Dacko; Chad: Tombalbaye; Comoros: 
Abdallah; Congo: Youlou; Djibouti: Gouled Aptidon; Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Lumumba; Equatorial Guinea: Macias Nguema; Eritrea: Afeworki; Gabon: Mba; 
Gambia: Jawara; Ghana: Nkrumah; Guinea Bissau: Cabral; Guinea: Toure; Kenya: 
Kenyatta; Lesotho: Jonathan; Libya: Qaddafi; Mauritania: Ould Daddah; Madagascar: 
Tsiranana; Mauritius: Ramgoolan; Mali: Keita; Morocco: Mohammed V; Mozambique: 
Machel; Nambia: Nujoma; Nigeria: Balewa; Niger: Diori; Rwanda: Kayibanda; Senegal: 
Senghor; Sierra Leone: M. Margai; Somalia: Osman Daar; Sudan: Al-Azhari; Swaziland:   
Subhuza II; Tanzania: Nyerere; Togo: Olympio; Uganda: Obote; Zambia: Kaunda; 
Zimbabwe: Mugabe 
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